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Abstract
Following the Bayesian communication learning paradigm, we propose a finite
population learning concept to capture the level of information aggregation in any
given network, where agents are allowed to communicate with neighbors repeatedly
before making a single decision. This concept helps determine the occurrence of
effective information aggregation in a finite network and reveals explicit interplays
among parameters. It also enables meaningful comparative statics regarding the
effectiveness of information aggregation in networks. Moreover, it offers a solid
foundation to address, with a new perfect learning concept, long run dynamics of
learning behavior and the associated learning rates as population diverges. Our
conditions for the occurrence of finite population learning and perfect learning in
communication networks are very tractable and transparent.
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1 Introduction
The effectiveness of information aggregation has been long and widely recognized as a
central theme for good decision making at both individual and aggregate levels. Boosted
by the Internet and particularly online social networks, this theme is especially impor-
tant in communication and decision making in the modern world. People communicate
with their friends, through extremely efficient, open and multi-dimensional approaches,
in social networks before making specific decisions. In particular, these circumstances
of information exchange often involve strategic interactions among people, which call for
new modeling techniques beyond mainstream statistics and economics literature, such as
the convolution of game theory and graphical models.
Recently, Acemoglu et al. (2012a) provide a fascinating model to study communication
in social networks and the implications for information aggregation. They employ a game-
theoretic framework to model people’s information aggregation in social networks. They
define an intuitive concept of asymptotic learning, which means as the population of a
network diverges, the probability that a large fraction of people take “correct” actions
converges to one or eventually exceeds a high threshold. Given agents communicate either
truthfully or strategically, they establish equilibrium conditions under which asymptotic
learning occurs. They also discuss the welfare implications of asymptotic learning, and
investigate the impacts of specific types of cost structures and social cliques.
Motivated by the asymptotic learning concept, we ask the following questions. Can
we define a good communication learning concept regarding a finite population network?
If so, does such learning occur in a given finite social network? What are necessary and
sufficient conditions to guarantee such learning? Can we write down clean and tractable
rates at which a society achieves long run asymptotic learning? These questions are
relevant and important, because it is common practice for people to assess the effectiveness
of information aggregation in given organizations, regions or nations. Such assessment
regarding finite population networks naturally offers a solid foundation for people to
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understand the quality of social learning when the society evolves. As of now, current
researchers in social networks have not provided desirable answers to these questions,
and previous works called for fresh inputs (Goyal (2009); Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2010);
Jackson (2010)).
Based on an information exchange game in social networks modified from
Acemoglu et al. (2012a), we propose a finite population learning concept, which captures
the level of aggregation of disperse information in any given communication network. In
the model, there is an underlying state. People in a social network do not know the
underlying state, but they have a common prior on the distribution of the state. After
receiving initial private signals related to the underlying state, they exchange information
simultaneously in the network, at times specified by a homogenous Poisson process, until
taking an irreversible action to exit the network. Upon each person’s exit, she makes an
estimate of the underlying state. Her payoff depends on the waiting time before making
the decision and the expected mean-square error between her estimate and the underlying
state. The longer she waits, the more information she gathers and hence the better her
estimate is, but the more discounting incurs. Thus, she needs to take a prompt action
after obtaining sufficient amount of information in the network.
The newly defined finite population learning concept involves three parameters, ǫ, ǫ¯,
and δ for a given social network Gn of population size n; rigorously, it is called (ǫ, ǫ¯, δ)-
learning. The parameter ǫ is the precision under which an agent’s decision is considered
“correct”, 1 − ǫ¯ represents the fraction of agents in the network who make the approx-
imately correct decision, and 1 − δ represents the probability at which such a fraction
of agents make the approximately correct decision. We think of these three parameters
as tolerance parameters of finite population learning. To contrast with asymptotically
driven concepts, (ǫ, ǫ¯, δ)-learning is simply referred to as finite population learning in
verbal discussions.
We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of finite population
learning under any given equilibrium. Intuitively, finite population learning is more likely
3
to occur when the number of signals an agent obtains under equilibrium is larger, or the
tolerances of learning are larger. Interestingly, the impact of the information precisions on
finite population learning is ambiguous, which parallels the well-known Hirshleifer effect
and subsequent work on the social value of information but stems from a new and different
mechanism. We also provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of finite
population learning under any equilibrium, namely, without knowledge of a particular
equilibrium.
A straightforward advantage of our conditions is that these conditions lead to meaning-
ful comparative statics regarding the effectiveness of information aggregation in networks.
In these conditions, the underlying forces, such as tolerances, information precisions and
information-sensitiveness, that shape the effectiveness of information aggregation in a
given finite communication network are explicitly displayed in a single formula. Com-
pared to the asymptotic learning results in previous literature, our conditions for finite
population learning involve only one equilibrium outcome, which is the number of signals
an agent obtains when she exits under equilibrium. More importantly, different from
our finite population learning concept in which the total amount of information is fixed,
the existing asymptotic learning literature employs an implicit assumption that the total
amount of information grows linearly with the population size. Hence, the learning status
with respect to a sequence of networks with growing population reflects not only the ef-
fectiveness of information aggregation of certain network structures, but also an increased
endowment of total information. Our finite population learning concept overcomes this
defect and disentangles the effectiveness of information aggregation from the growth of
information endowment.
The finite population learning concept enables us to investigate the rate at which a
sequence of growing communication networks {Gn}∞n=1, which is referred to as a society,
reaches perfect learning. Perfect learning occurs if all communication networks in a society
achieve finite population learning under vanishing tolerances as population grows. For
example, we say δ-perfect learning occurs along society {Gn}∞n=1 if i). (ǫ, ǫ¯, δn)-learning
4
occurs for each network Gn in the society, and ii). δn goes to zero as n goes to infinity.
The learning rate is characterized by the sequence {δn}∞n=1. Clearly, faster learning rate
implies perfect learning is reached at a higher quality. It is instructive to distinguish our
learning rate concept from the speed of convergence to a pre-defined consensus in existing
social learning literature, which mainly concerns about the time towards a consensus in
a circumstance where people make repeated decisions and learn from others’ previous
decisions to help to make their own future decisions. In such a context, the observable
sequence of aggregate decisions naturally reveals the dynamics of information aggregation
along the time dimension. In our story of direct communication, however, although people
communicate with each other repeatedly, they only make a single decision, and different
people may go through varying communication rounds before their decisions. This makes
the time dynamics of information aggregation largely unobservable, and thus calls for
alternative dimensions to look into the information dynamics.
We have given conditions for societies to reach δ-perfect learning at a certain desired
rate {δn}∞n=1. Given a sequence of networks and the associated equilibria, we define
an equilibrium informed agent as one who obtains an unbounded number of signals as
the population size goes to infinity. The δ-perfect learning occurs if almost all agents
in the society are equilibrium informed. Moreover, without involving any equilibrium,
we define a socially informed agent (roughly) as one who has an unbounded number of
neighbors in a finite distance as the population goes to infinity. The δ-perfect learning
occurs if almost all agents are socially informed. We also explicitly explore the achievable
fastest learning rate for perfect learning in a given society. Under some circumstances,
achievable learning rate could be in the exponential order. This implies that a society
with growing population might achieve a desirable level of finite population learning very
quickly.
Relation to Literature. Our work lies in the category of Bayesian social learning
in social networks, in which decision makers in a social network update their information
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according to the Bayes’ rule. General Bayesian social learning is divided into two sub-
categories, namely Bayesian observational learning and Bayesian communication learning.
In Bayesian observational learning, agents observe past actions of their neighbors. From
these observed actions, agents update their beliefs and make inferences. Herd behavior
is a very typical consequence of observational learning. In literature, Banerjee (1992),
Bikhchandani et al. (1992) and Smith and Sorensen (2000) are early attempts to model
herd effects through Bayesian observational learning. Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004)
and Smith and Sorensen (2008) relax the assumption of full observation network topol-
ogy and study Bayesian observational learning with sampling of past actions. Recently,
Acemoglu et al. (2011) and Muller-Frank (2012) investigate how detailed network struc-
tures could add new interesting insights.
Our work belongs to Bayesian communication learning, which means that agents can-
not directly observe actions of others but can communicate with each other before mak-
ing a decision. Consequently, agents update their beliefs and make inferences based
on the information given by others. New interesting considerations arise in Bayesian
communication learning; for example, agents may not want to truthfully reveal their
information to others through communication. Crawford and Sobel (1982) pioneers the
research in strategic communication, and Acemoglu et al. (2012a) is an interesting piece
that looks into how communication learning shapes information aggregation in social net-
works. Other works such as Galeotti et al. (2011) and Hagenbach and Koessler (2010)
also study strategic communication in social networks, but their focus is not on informa-
tion aggregation.
There is a branch of literature that applies various non-Bayesian updating methods
to investigate information aggregation and social learning. DeGroot (1974) develops a
tractable non-Bayesian learning model which is frequently employed in research of social
networks today. Essentially, the DeGroot model is pertaining to observational learning, in
which agents make today’s decisions by taking the average of neighbors’ beliefs revealed in
their decisions yesterday. DeGroot (2003) and Golub and Jackson (2010, 2012a,b,c) apply
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the DeGroot model to financial networks and general social networks, respectively. By a
field experiment, Mobius et al. (2010) compares a non-Bayesian model of communication
with a model in which agents communicate their signals and update information based on
Bayes’ rule. Their evidence is generally in favor of the Bayesian communication learning
approach.
Our paper is most related to Acemoglu et al. (2012a). Compared to their work, we
employ a simplified framework for network communication and exploit more undeveloped
mechanisms. In particular, we mainly focus on the effect of social learning and infor-
mation aggregation in finite population communication networks. This allows for clear
comparative statics with respect to learning, and for discussion on the rates of learning
as the population increases. As of now, researchers have not provided desirable results in
finite population communication network as well as results regarding learning rates. To
the best of our knowledge, our work is the first attempt to address these questions with
clear answers.
Our work is also related to Golub and Jackson (2012a,b,c), in particular on the in-
vestigation of learning rate. Golub and Jackson (2012a,b,c) employ the DeGroot model
to analyze the impacts of homophily in social networks, which refers to the tendency of
agents to associate relatively more with those who are similar to them, on the learning
rate in the context of observational learning. Our results of learning rate are different from
theirs in two aspects. First, our focus is on Bayesian communication learning rather than
non-Bayesian observational learning. Second, as discussed before, our concept of learning
rate is based on perfect learning as the population in networks diverges, rather than the
time towards a consensus in their model. An appealing feature of Golub and Jackson
(2012a,b,c) is that their results of learning rate are based on certain statistics of networks
rather than the full network structures, which could lead to potentially more empirical
traction.
We would also like to relate this work to social network papers in existing statistics
literature. The larger part of those papers are based on graphical models, which are ideal
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to describe structural formation. Rather than providing a list of state-of-the-art contribu-
tions, we refer interested readers to Newman (2010) and Kolacazyk (2009), which might
serve as a broad introduction to the field. Our work supplements structural modeling
with human behavior modeling through game theory. Such model enrichment is neces-
sary for some specific objectives; for example, we will see that strategic interaction and
contextual information that sit outside graphical models are crucial to determine the final
information aggregation status. Also, our theoretical results are in the same spirit of the
finite sample results in the statistical learning theory, such as the Vapnik-Chervonenkis
inequality. Such results with a clear characterization of strategic interactions may have
potential to expand the scope of the finite sample approach beyond statistical learning
theory.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the information
exchange game and characterizes its equilibrium. New finite population learning concept
is proposed in Section 3. Section 4 discusses dynamics of learning and addresses learning
rates explicitly. In the final section, we discuss possible directions for further research.
All proofs are in the supplementary materials.
2 The Model
In this section, we present our model of information exchange in social networks, which is
closely related to Acemoglu et al. (2012a), but has different focus. In this model, people,
formally called as agents, are organized in some network structure. Each agent has her
initial information. Agents are able to solicit information from their neighbors through
communication, restricted by the network structure and a communication clock. The
communication clock defines the times at which each agent is able to communicate with
others. At each round of communication, agents are obliged to transmit truthfully all
information they have to their neighbors in the network. By such communication, the
information set of an agent can become larger as time evolves. With the help of her initial
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and acquired information, every agent is able to make a decision and exit. An exit strategy
is needed due to the time value of information content. After exit, an agent would not
have any incentive to further acquire information from neighbors, but she is still obliged
to transmit all her information to others in the next round of communication. Through
certain measure of agents’ decisions, we are further able to characterize the quality of
learning and information aggregation.
We make the following assumptions to simplify the analysis and focus on a concept
of finite population learning, which will be rigorously defined in the next section. First,
we assume mandatory communication, which means that no agent holds her information
to herself. When communication times arrive, an agent has to send all her information
set to all of her direct neighbors. Second, we assume truthful communication, which
means whenever an agent sends information, she has to send unmanipulated information,
whether it is her own private information or obtained information originated from other
agents. We will first analyze communication and information aggregation in a given finite
population network, and then consider the limit as the population grows to infinity. In
this course, we assume that existing links are kept when a network grows.
Before formal definition of the game, we would like to illustrate how information flows
with an example. For simplicity, suppose there are four agents in the network below. At
time t = 0, each agent i has some private signal si, which captures her initial information.
So the total information endowment in the system is {s1, s2, s3, s4}. Communication
occurs at t = 1, 2. Due to the structure of the graph in our example, there is no need to
consider beyond the second communication round, since no additional information will
be communicated further.
1 I1 = {s1}t = 0 :
2 3
4
We will study two cases, and focus on agent 1’s information set I1. In the first case,
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suppose no agent exits after time t = 0. So the information flow is as follows:
1 I1 = {s1, s2, s3}t = 1 :
2 3 I3 = {s3, s4}
4
s2 s3
s4
1 I1 = {s1, s2, s3, s4}t = 2 :
2 3 I3 = {s3, s4}
4
s4
After the first round of communication, i.e., t = 1, agent 1 has signals {s1, s2, s3}. Also
note that at this time agent 3 has {s3, s4}. At t = 2, agent 3 sends the newly grabbed
signal s4 to agent 1. So agent 1’s information set enriches to {s1, s2, s3, s4}.
In the second case, suppose agent 3 exits after time t = 0, then she is still obliged to
send all her signals (in this case, only her private signal) she acquires to neighbors, but
she does not have any incentive to receive others’ signal. Therefore, the information flow
is as follows.
1 I1 = {s1, s2, s3}t = 1 :
2 3 I3 = {s3}
4
s2 s3
1 I1 = {s1, s2, s3}t = 2 :
2 3 I3 = {s3}
4
Note that as agent 3 does not receive signal from agent 4 at t = 1, she does not have
any new information to send to agent 1 at the second communication round. Therefore,
agent 1’s information set is still {s1, s2, s3} at t = 2. By contrasting the two cases in this
toy example, we see that agents’ decisions affect the information flow in the network.
Now we formally introduce the information exchange game. Suppose we are interested
in a social network with agents N n = {1, 2, ..., n}. To model communication in the
network, we organize these agents in a directed graph Gn = (N n, En), in which each node
i ∈ N n represents an agent. We allow directed graphs to have multi-edges, so that two
agents can communicate to each other. An ordered pair (j, i) ∈ En means agent j can
send information to agent i directly. The goal of every agent is to estimate θ ∈ R, which
represents an underlying state of the world. Agents’ knowledge of θ is captured by a
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normally distributed common prior θ ∼ N(0, 1/ρ). At time t = 0, agent i is endowed
with her private signal si = θ + zi. All zi ∼ N(0, 1/ρ¯) are independent and they are also
independent of θ. The distributions of zi’s are common knowledge and so is the network
architecture. Our results are not affected if the means of θ and zi are changed to non-zero
values.
In this network, agents exchange their information as follows. Suppose agents live
in a world with continuous time t ∈ [0,∞). Waiting induces a common exponential
discount of the payoff with rate r > 0. Instead of communicating at fixed times, all agents
communicate simultaneously at some points in time that follow a homogeneous Poisson
process with rate λ > 0, which is independent of θ and zi. This Poisson clock is also
common knowledge. After communication, agents update beliefs according to the Bayes’
rule. For example, the posterior distribution of θ on k distinct signals is Gaussian with
precision ρ+ kρ¯. So more private information, i.e., a higher k, will increase the precision
and lead to a better estimate. Hence, there is a natural trade-off between waiting to get
more information and acting earlier to reduce the discount of information value, which
makes an optimal stopping problem for each agent i. We call the incentive to get more
information information effect, and the incentive to act earlier discount effect. In this
course, at any given time t, each agent i either makes an estimate xi of the fundamental
state of the world θ, or “wait” for more information. Just as illustrated in the four agents’
example, we assume that after agents make estimate and exit, they do not receive new
information, but they continue to transmit information that they have already obtained
when new rounds of communication take place.
We introduce a few more notations to facilitate the discussion. Let Ini,t denote the
information set of agent i at time t. We next specify the payoff structure and the opti-
mization problem faced by agents. Suppose agent i takes action xi at time t when the
realization of the underlying state is θ, then her instantaneous payoff of taking an action
xi is
uni (xi) = ψ − (xi − θ)2 ,
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where ψ is a real-valued constant that captures the information sensitiveness of the deci-
sion problem, which we will elaborate later. At time t with information set Ini,t, agent i’s
optimal expected instantaneous payoff of taking an action before discounting is
Uni,t(I
n
i,t) = max
xi
E(uni (xi)|Ini,t) .
It is easy to see that agent i’s optimal estimate is xn,∗i,t = E[θ|Ini,t] if she decides to act at
time t. Thanks to the normality assumption of the fundamental θ and signals {si}ni=1,
the optimal expected instantaneous payoff of agent i taking an action after observing k
distinct signals can be calculated explicitly:
E[ψ − (xn,∗i,t − θ)2|Ini,t] = ψ −
1
ρ+ ρ¯k
. (2.1)
At any time t with information set Ini,t, before trying to make a best estimate and exit,
agent i has to make a decision about whether to exit. To facilitate the analysis, we first
assume that any agent can obtain non-negative payoff upon her exit. This assumption will
be formally characterized after we define the equilibrium. As a result, due to discount in
time, each agent should make an estimate and exit precisely at a finite time, and especially,
at a time instantaneously after communications take place. Moreover, each agent would
only get finite number of signals even if they waited forever, because there are in total
n signals {si}ni=1 in the network. Therefore, we actually only need to consider strategy
profiles in which every agent exits at a finite communication round, rather than at any
arbitrary time. Denote by ln = (ln1 , . . . , l
n
n), where each l
n
i is agent i’s communication
round before exit. Throughout the paper, we use ln−i to denote l
n without the component
lni . Let τk be the physical time until k rounds of communication. Agent i’s payoff for
choosing action lni is
Uni (l
n
i , l
n
−i) = E
{
e
−rτln
i max
xi
E[ψ − (xi − θ)2|Ini (ln)]
}
,
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where Ini (l
n) is agent i’s information set upon exit, which depends on other agents’ exit
strategies ln−i. By (2.1) and the exponential waiting time of the Poisson clock, we have
Uni (l
n
i , l
n
−i) = r¯
lni
(
ψ − 1
ρ+ ρ¯kn,l
n
i
)
,
where r¯ = λ/(λ + r) and kn,l
n
i is the number of signals agent i get upon exit if every
agent acts according to ln in the network Gn. With this reduction, the following complete
information static game will be considered.
Definition 1 The information exchange game Γinfo(Gn) is a triple {N n,Ln,Un}, in
which
(a) N n is the set of agents, i.e., N n = {1, 2, ..., n};
(b) Ln is the collection of agents’ strategy spaces. For any agent i ∈ N n, her strategy
space Lni ∈ Ln is a finite set
Lni = {0, 1, 2, ..., (Lni )max} ,
where (Lni )max = maxj∈Gn{length of shortest path from j to i} ;
(c) Uni ∈ Un is the payoff function for agent i:
Uni (l
n
i , l
n
−i) = r¯
lni
(
ψ − 1
ρ+ ρ¯kn,l
n
i
)
. (2.2)
We consider pure-strategy Nash equilibria of this game. As an agent’s payoff gain
from waiting is weakly larger (i.e., no smaller than) when other agents also wait more
rounds, the information exchange game is a supermodular game. The following result is
a direct application of Topkis (1979), which guarantees the existence of a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium in supermodular games.
Lemma 1 The information exchange game Γinfo(Gn) has at least one pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium.
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We denote a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the game by σn,∗, and the set of all
pure-strategy Nash equilibria by Σn,∗. We further denote by ln,σ
∗
i the communication
steps after which agent i exits under equilibrium σn,∗, and denote by kn,σ
∗
i the number of
distinct signals agent i has obtained when she exits under equilibrium σn,∗. In order to
make sure that every agent i gets non-negative payoffs and exits ultimately in the initial
strategic circumstance of information exchange, we focus on information exchange games
and associated equilibria that satisfy the following assumption in the rest of this section.
Assumption 1 ψ[ρ+ ρ¯(kn,σ
∗
i )max] > 1 for all agent i, where (k
n,σ∗
i )max is the maximum
number of signals agent i can get if all other agents choose their exit steps according to
σn,∗.
The parameter ψ captures the information sensitiveness of the decision problem. In-
terestingly, the information sensitiveness of the decision problem is not monotone in ψ.
When ψ takes negative or very small positive value, agents would like to wait forever
to discount payoff to zero, in which case the decision problem is information irrelevant.
When ψ is large enough, information is relevant. Specifically, when ψ is moderate, in-
formation effect dominates, and thus the decision problem is more information sensitive;
while when ψ is large, the discount effect dominates, and thus the decision problem is less
information sensitive.
Now we provide an example of the network game and its equilibrium. On the four-
agent graph displayed previously, suppose λ = r, ψ = 1 and ρ = ρ¯ = 1
2
. The decision
problem for agents 2 and 4 are simple. They should exit right away because they will not
get any new signals due to graph structure, but incur discounting penalty should they
not act promptly. The payoff matrix for agent 1 (row) and 3 (column) is as follows, in
which the first and the second value in each cell are respectively the payoffs of agent 1
and agent 3 [see (2.2)].
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Agent 3
0 Step 1 Step
0 Step 0, 0 0, 1
6
Agent 1 1 Step 1
4
, 0 1
4
, 1
6
2 Step 1
8
, 0 3
20
, 1
6
There is one equilibrium of the game. In this equilibrium, agents 2 and 4 exits immediately
after they receive their private signals, while agent 1 and agent 3 exit after the first
communication round.
Before proceeding to discuss information aggregation or learning status, we briefly dis-
cuss the equilibrium outcomes of the strategy game in Definition 1. This reduced game is
a complete information static game, which involves no uncertainty. However, the uncer-
tainties in the fundamental and in the communication clock were abstracted out through
taking expectations, which results in the deterministic payoff function (2.2). Therefore
the two equilibrium outcomes, ln,σ
∗
i and k
n,σ∗
i , both deterministic, characterize the strate-
gic interactions of information exchange among agents in the initial circumstance. This
enables us to characterize a learning status by focusing only on such equilibrium outcomes.
We can perform the following comparative statics of the number of signals agent i ob-
tains under equilibrium kn,σ
∗
i . Intuitively, k
n,σ∗
i is larger when the discount rate is smaller
or the Poisson clock is faster. It is also larger when the precision of public information
ρ is lower or the decision problem is more information sensitive. However, the precision
of private information ρ¯ has ambiguous impact on kn,σ
∗
i , because an increase in the pre-
cision of private information has two conflicting effects. It increases not only the relative
quality of the private signal at hand, which prompts an agent to exit earlier, but also
the relative information content of her neighbors’ private signals, which in turn encour-
ages her to wait. The former effect is stronger when the precision of public information
is higher, while the latter is stronger when the precision of public information is lower.
The discussions in this paragraph can be formalized against mathematical rigor, but the
game-theoretic technicality involved is beyond the scope of this paper.
15
Finally, we also remark that the role of kn,σ
∗
i is our paper is similar to the influence
vector v in Acemoglu et al. (2012b). The quantity kn,σ
∗
i will play a central role in the
next sections.
3 Finite Population Learning
In this section, we measure the level of information aggregation in any given communica-
tion network. Related recent research on learning in social networks focuses on asymptotic
learning, which means that as the fraction of agents taking the correct action converging
to one as the population of the social network grows large (Acemoglu et al. (2011, 2012a)).
However, as discussed in Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2010), people are also interested in the
information dynamics away from long run limit. In pursuing this goal, a new concept of
learning in social networks is introduced.
Definition 2 Given a social network Gn, the information exchange game Γinfo(Gn) and
an equilibrium profile σn,∗, for a triple (ε, ε¯, δ), we say Gn achieves (ε, ε¯, δ)-learning under
σn,∗ if
Pσn,∗
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
(1−Mn,εi ) > ε¯
)
6 δ ,
where Mn,εi = 1(|xi − θ| 6 ε), xi is agent i’s optimal action upon exit, and Pσn,∗ denotes
the conditional probability given σn,∗ .
In this definition, the parameter ε sets the precision on what the approximately correct
decision is for individual agents, 1 − ε¯ controls the fraction of agents who make the
approximately correct decision, and 1− δ represents the probability at which such a high
fraction of agents make the approximately correct decision. In particular, we highlight
the difference between ε and ε¯, because these two parameters capture different tolerances.
Concretely, ε is at the individual level while ε¯ is at the aggregate level.
A natural question to ask is whether such finite population learning occurs in a given
communication network. If so, under what conditions? The following proposition provides
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a necessary condition and a sufficient condition for (ε, ε¯, δ)-learning in a given social
network under any equilibrium profile. When there is no confusion, we refer to the
information exchange game Γinfo(Gn) simply as Gn. Denote by erf(x) =
2√
pi
∫ x
0
e−t
2
dt the
error function of the standard normal distribution.
Proposition 1 For a given social network Gn under any equilibrium σ
∗(= σn,∗),
(a) (ε, ε¯, δ)-learning does not occur if
1
n
n∑
i=1
erf

ε
√
ρ+ ρ¯kn,σ
∗
i
2

 < (1− ε¯)(1− δ) . (3.1)
(b) (ε, ε¯, δ)-learning occurs if
1
n
n∑
i=1
erf

ε
√
ρ+ ρ¯kn,σ
∗
i
2

 > 1− ε¯δ . (3.2)
This proposition provides clear conditions for the occurrence of finite population learn-
ing. Our conditions are more operative and transparent than their asymptotic counter-
parts in previous literature. Specifically, our conditions only require one equilibrium
outcome kn,σ
∗
i , and the set {kn,σ
∗
i }ni=1 is directly induced by an equilibrium σn,∗ in a com-
munication network Gn. Hence, conditions (3.1) and (3.2) not only allow us to investigate
the effect of learning in a given communication network, but also offer a more interpretable
link between the communication equilibrium and its corresponding information aggrega-
tion status.
Conditions (3.1) and (3.2) also allow us to untangle the interplay among parameters.
For example, we are able to answer the following question. Given the tolerances ε, ε¯, δ
and the information precisions ρ and ρ¯, how does the change of kn,σ
∗
i affect the occurrence
of finite population learning in a given social network Gn? When k
n,σ∗
i ’s are sufficiently
small to validate condition (3.1), finite population learning does not occur. Similarly, when
most of kn,σ
∗
i ’s are sufficiently large so that the condition (3.2) is satisfied, finite population
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learning occurs. Similar marginal interpretations also apply to parameters ε, ε¯, δ, ρ and ρ¯.
Generally, finite population learning in a given social network Gn is more likely to occur
when the equilibrium induces larger numbers of signals obtained by agents. It is also more
likely to occur when the tolerances and the information precisions are higher. As interplays
among the parameters ε, ε¯, δ, ρ, ρ¯ and kn,σ
∗
i are clear through (3.1) and (3.2), the two
conditions provide various comparative statics that help us better understand learning
in different social circumstances. Since the total amount of information is fixed in any
finite population network, these comparative statics indeed disentangle the effectiveness
of information aggregation from the endowment of information, so that the net effect of
information aggregation is transparent.
It is interesting to note that (1 − ε¯)(1 − δ) < 1 − ε¯δ for any 0 < ε¯, δ < 1. This gap
indicates that failure of condition (3.1) does not necessarily lead to condition (3.2), and
vice versa. Two perspectives help understand this gap. First, we use Markov’s inequality
to get tractable forms of the necessary and the sufficient conditions. Sharper inequalities
may lead to weaker conditions and thus probably fill a part of the gap, but they are likely
to make these conditions intractable and less transparent. Secondly and more importantly,
as we discussed above, conditions (3.1) and (3.2) involve equilibrium outcomes in a clean
and simple formula. The cost for enjoying this clarity is that we did not fully utilize
{kn,σ∗i }ni=1.
Also, a beauty of symmetry arises in our necessary and sufficient conditions for finite
population learning. The parameters ε¯ and δ are completely interchangeable in these con-
ditions, which was not expected as they captures tolerances in different categories. On the
other hand, in our two conditions, parameter ε stands in a position that is unchangeable
with ε¯ and δ, which hints that ε and ε¯ play different roles in finite population learning.
Conditions (3.1) and (3.2) have powerful implications. The next corollary establishes
a necessary condition and a sufficient condition without equilibirum outcomes. The proof
is straightforward, but the results are non-trivial.
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Corollary 1 For any social network Gn and any equilibrium σ
n,∗,
(a) (ε, ε¯, δ)-learning does not occur if
erf
(
ε
√
ρ+ ρ¯n
2
)
< (1− ε¯)(1− δ) . (3.3)
(b) (ε, ε¯, δ)-learning occurs if
erf
(
ε
√
ρ+ ρ¯
2
)
> 1− ε¯δ . (3.4)
Corollary 1 follows from the fact that 1 ≤ kn,σ∗i ≤ n. It is interesting because under
some circumstances, we can determine the occurrence of finite population learning without
knowing either the structure of the social network or the equilibrium. Intuitively, if any
one parameter of the tolerances, information precisions or population size is too low, such
that the condition (3.3) is satisfied, we may conclude that finite population learning does
not occur no matter how effective the communication network is organized. Conversely, if
any one of the tolerances or information precisions is sufficiently large such that condition
(3.4) holds, we know that finite population learning surely occurs even if all agents are
isolated.
Finally, as the information exchange game exhibits strategic complementarity, it is ex-
pected that multiple equilibria might emerge under some circumstances. An interesting
perspective in investigating finite population learning is to measure the effect of learning
against multiple equilibria. We provide the following generalized (conservative) version
of finite population learning to accommodate multiple equilibria without equilibrium se-
lection.
Definition 3 Denote by Σn,∗ = {σn,∗} the set of equilibria of Γinfo(Gn). The (ε, ε¯, δ)-
learning occurs if
sup
σn,∗∈Σn,∗
Pσn,∗
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
(1−Mn,εi ) > ε¯
)
6 δ .
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This definition offers a conservative standard to evaluate finite population learning in
the sense that the least favorable equilibrium determines the learning status. When Σn,∗
is a singleton, the above definition reduces to Definition 2. The proof of Proposition 1
can be recycled to derive the next corollary.
Corollary 2 Given an information exchange game Γinfo(Gn),
(a) (ε, ε¯, δ)-learning does not occur if
min
σn,∗∈Σn,∗
1
n
n∑
i=1
erf

ε
√
ρ+ ρ¯kn,σ
∗
i
2

 < (1− ε¯)(1− δ) .
(b) (ε, ε¯, δ)-learning occurs if
min
σn,∗∈Σn,∗
1
n
n∑
i=1
erf

ε
√
ρ+ ρ¯kn,σ
∗
i
2

 > 1− ε¯δ .
4 Perfect Learning and the Rates
Based on the analysis of finite population learning, we consider the effect of information
aggregation and learning as population in communication networks grows. Our approach
to address the limiting behavior of learning is different from asymptotic learning in existing
literature (Acemoglu et al. (2011, 2012a)). In particular, we highlight finite population
learning as the foundation of asymptotic learning. Consequently, we are able to check
learning status all along the path to the limit, and the probabilistic tolerance parameters
naturally induce learning rates. This concept of learning rate is different from what is
employed in Golub and Jackson (2012a,b,c) that focuses on the time dimension.
4.1 Perfect Learning
Recall that we have three tolerance parameters ε, ε¯, and δ that define (ε, ε¯, δ)-learning.
To inquire the limiting behavior in a society {Gn}∞n=1, where existing links are kept when
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networks grow, we can focus on one parameter at a time, keeping the other two fixed.
The following definition introduces δ-perfect learning on a given society {Gn}∞n=1.
Definition 4 We say δ-perfect learning occurs in society {Gn}∞n=1 under equilibria
{σn,∗}∞n=1 if there exists a vanishing positive sequence {δn}∞n=1 such that (ε, ε¯, δn)-learning
occurs in Gn under its associated σ
n,∗ for all n .
Compared to the perfect asymptotic learning concept in Acemoglu et al. (2012a), our
definition of perfect learning is both stronger and more general for the following reasons.
First, we require the networks in the society to achieve learning not only in the limit but
also all along the path towards the limit. Second, by focusing on different parameters ε,
ε¯ and δ, we could address three different kinds of asymptotic learning. As discussed in
the previous section, these three parameters exhibit different impacts on finite popula-
tion learning, so that they can play different roles in perfect learning. Third and most
importantly, this definition allows us to investigate learning rates, which is the focus of
the next subsection.
In the following, we will derive two sufficient conditions for δ-perfect learning. The
first condition, stated as Proposition 2, relies on the equilibrium outcome kn,σ
∗
i . The
second condition, stated as Proposition 3, relies only on the formation of the society. To
deliver the first sufficient condition, we define an equilibrium informed agent in a society.
Definition 5 (Equilibrium Informed Agent) For agent i in a given society {Gn}∞n=1,
she is equilibrium informed with respect to {Gn}∞n=1 under equilibria {σn,∗}∞n=1 if
lim
n→∞
kn,σ
∗
i =∞ .
An agent has equilibrium informed status means that she enjoys increasing information
advantage as population grows. The next proposition offers a sufficient condition for δ-
perfect learning. In a similar spirit, we have a more general sufficient condition, Lemma 3,
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in the supplementary materials. The proof of Proposition 2 is omitted as it is a corollary
to Lemma 3.
Proposition 2 The δ-perfect learning occurs in a society {Gn}∞n=1 under equilibria
{σn,∗}∞n=1 if
lim
n→∞
1
n
|EIn,∗| = 1 ,
where EIn,∗ the set of equilibrium informed agents in the network Gn under equilibrium
σn,∗.
Proposition 2 states that perfect learning occurs when almost all agents are equilibrium
informed. This is consistent with the idea of social learning that successful learning
allows individuals to have sufficient information to make a good decision, and that such
individuals represent an overwhelming proportion of the society. We can have such a
transparent condition because our perfect learning concept is powered by finite population
learning, a sufficient condition of which only involves one set of equilibrium variables:
{kn,σ∗i }.
Next we consider the second sufficient condition that relies only on formation of the
society. To streamline the presentation in the main texts, we assume that each agent
enjoys a positive payoff even if she exits at the beginning. From (2.1), this is equivalent
to the following assumption.
Assumption 2 (ρ+ ρ¯)ψ > 1 .
We will hold this assumption for the rest of this section. In the supplementary mate-
rials, we relax this assumption and discuss all possible cases.
Before looking into the next sufficient condition for perfect learning, we first point out
an important observation which states that, although the number of signals an agent gets
in equilibrium may diverge to infinity with growth of the communication network, the
equilibrium communication steps will not increase unboundedly.
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Lemma 2 Under Assumption 2, for any agent i, the communication rounds she optimally
experiences before taking an action in any social network Gn is bounded from above by a
constant independent of n. Mathematically,
ln,σ
∗
i 6 l
n
i < min
{
(Lni )max, ln
(
1− 1
(ρ+ ρ¯)ψ
)
/ ln r¯
}
, (4.1)
in which lni stands for the optimal communication rounds for agent i given that other
agents wait until the maximum allowable step, and (Lni )max is the maximum length of all
paths ended with i in Gn.
A more general version (without Assumption 2) of Lemma 2 with its associated proof is
included in the supplementary materials as Lemma 4. A key idea behind Lemma 2 is that
after agent i gets sufficiently large number of signals within some finite communication
steps, even expecting infinite number of signals does not justify the discount of further
waiting. The intuition is that for well connected agents, they will get sufficient information
after a few communication rounds to make a decision, whereas for the not well connected
agents, waiting too long discounts their information value. From condition (4.1), we see
that the upper bound is exclusively determined by parameters of the information exchange
game.
Lemma 2 plays an important role in shaping our next sufficient condition that bypasses
equilibrium and directly links perfect learning to network formations. Recall Proposition
2 which states that almost all agents’ kn,σ
∗
i →∞ is sufficient for perfect learning. On the
other hand, from Lemma 2 we know that no agent has an optimal unbounded commu-
nication step ln,σ
∗
i . By combining the two observations, we know the only possibility to
validate Proposition 2 is that almost all agents get unbounded number of signals within fi-
nite communication steps. This consideration leads to our following definition of a socially
informed agent.
Definition 6 (Socially Informed Agent) For each agent i in a given society
{Gn}∞n=1, let Li = min{l0 ∈ N : limn→∞ |Bni,l0 | = ∞}, where Bni,l is the set of agents
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in Gn whose shortest path to i has length at most l. Agent i is socially informed with
respect to {Gn}∞n=1 if Li is finite, and if there exists N ∈ N such that for n > N , we have
ψ − 1
ρ+ ρ¯|Bni,Li|
> 0 , (4.2)
and
r¯Li
(
ψ − 1
ρ+ ρ¯|Bni,Li|
)
> r¯l
(
ψ − 1
ρ+ ρ¯|Bni,l|
)
for all 0 ≤ l < Li . (4.3)
Moreover, we denote by SIn the set of socially informed agents in the network Gn.
In Definition 6, condition (4.2) is automatically satisfied in view of Assumption 2.
Intuitively, a socially informed agent can be reached by a large number of neighbors after
some finite communication steps Li. Furthermore, condition (4.3) ensures that this agent
strictly prefers to wait at least until the arrival of such communication step Li, given other
agents never exit. Therefore, agent i is guaranteed to obtain a large number of signals
from finite communication steps, if other agents never exit. Note also that the definition
of a socially informed agent does not require knowledge of any specific equilibrium. It only
depends on the topological structure of the graph and on the parameters in the information
exchange game. With the help of socially informed agents, we bypass equilibrium and
state the following sufficient condition for perfect learning.
Proposition 3 The δ-perfect learning occurs in a society {Gn}∞n=1 under any equilibrium
{σn,∗}∞n=1 if
lim
n→∞
1
n
|SIn| = 1 .
Proposition 3 is interesting because we can determine the occurrence of perfect learning
through knowledge on the formation of society alone. Given the tractable conditions for
socially informed agents, we can check whether a given society sufficiently supports perfect
learning under any equilibrium. Especially, given the difficulty of explicitly solving for
equilibria of the information exchange game in general cases, Proposition 3 is of more
value.
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4.2 Learning Rates
In this subsection we define the learning rate for δ-perfect learning. It is natural to expect
similar concepts of learning rates for ε-perfect learning and ε¯-perfect learning.
Definition 7 If δ-perfect learning occurs in {Gn}∞n=1 under equilibria {σn,∗}∞n=1, then we
call the corresponding sequence of tolerances {δn}∞n=1 the learning rate.
It is worth highlighting the difference between our learning rate concept and the speed
of convergence to a pre-defined consensus mainly employed in observational learning prob-
lems. The latter concerns about the time towards a consensus in a circumstance where
people make repeated decisions and learn from others’ previous decisions to help make
their own future decisions (Golub and Jackson (2012a,b,c)). In observational learning
problems with repeated decisions, the observable sequence of aggregate decisions natu-
rally reveals the time dynamics of information aggregation. However in direct commu-
nication setup, dynamics of information aggregation along the time dimension is largely
unobservable, which calls for alternative dimensions to look into the information dynam-
ics. Tolerance parameters {δn}∞i=1 offer a natural standpoint to look into the information
aggregation dynamics. This feature also distinguishes our work from existing literature
on learning rate of similar spirit. For example, Acemoglu et al. (2009) attempt to define
and investigate an asymptotic learning based rate in an observational learning context.
Although their concept also captures a sequence of diminishing probabilities, it does not
characterize the learning status in every social network along the society.
On the other hand, it is not trivial to construct concretely the smallest sequence
{δn}∞n=1 for perfect learning, while keeping other parameters fixed. Recall that the suffi-
cient condition part of Proposition 1 implies δ-perfect learning occurs with rates {δn}∞n=1
if
1
n
n∑
i=1
erf

ε
√
ρ+ ρ¯kn,σ
∗
i
2

 > 1− δnε¯ .
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Theoretically, if we can directly solve the inequalities with respect to δn, the achievable
fastest learning rate {δn}∞n=1 is constructed. However, some technical problems prevent
us from directly doing so. First, we cannot read off a transparent rate out of the error
function. Second, without specific knowledge of network formations, the relation between
kn,σ
∗
i and n is hard to be pinned down generally. Moreover, as we will see in the binomial
tree example, kn,σ
∗
i could be drastically different even for a same graph. Hence, we will
first discuss learning rates on specific examples, and generalize to more general categories
when possible.
Example 1 (Isolated Agents) When all agents are isolated from each other in a com-
munication network Gn, we have k
n,σ∗
i = 1 for every agent i.
In Example 1, the negative condition (3.1) is reduced to
erf
(
ε
√
ρ+ ρ¯
2
)
< (1− ε¯)(1− δn) .
If parameters are such that erf
(
ε
√
ρ+ρ¯
2
)
< (1 − ε¯), the above inequality holds for large
n for any vanishing sequence {δn}∞n=1. This tells us that in fairly general circumstances,
purely isolated society cannot achieve δ-perfect learning.
Example 2 (Complete Graph) When the communication network Gn is a complete
graph, and the benefit of getting n− 1 new signals justifies the discount of one communi-
cation step, kn,σ
∗
i = n for every agent i.
In Example 2, we have
erf
(
ε
√
ρ+ ρ¯n
2
)
> 1− δnε¯ , ∀n ∈ N ,
as a sufficient condition for δ-perfect learning, which translates to
δn >
1
ε¯
(
1− erf
(
ε
√
ρ+ ρ¯n
2
))
. (4.4)
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The sequence of the right hand sides of inequality (4.4) can serve as the learning rate. At
the cost of getting a conservative estimate, we approximate the error function in order to
get a more transparent learning rate. Note that the error function erf can be approximated
by
1− erf(x) < 1√
2π
1
x
e−x
2/2 .
Therefore a sufficient condition for δ-perfect learning is
δn >
1√
πε¯
1
ε
√
ρ+ ρ¯n
exp
(
−ε
2(ρ+ ρ¯n)
4
)
.
Keep other parameters fixed, and focus on the relations between population size n and
δn. We see that δn could decrease in the order of exp (−ρ¯ε2n/5). This implies that
when population grows, the probability that at least ε¯ fraction of people make the wrong
decision decreases very quickly to zero.
Following the idea of error function approximations, we go beyond Example 2 to
consider a more general case in which kn,σ
∗
i > f(n) for every agent i where f(n) is a
deterministic sequence. A sufficient condition for δ-perfect learning is then
δn >
1√
πε¯
1
ε
√
ρ+ ρ¯f(n)
exp
(
−ε
2(ρ+ ρ¯f(n))
4
)
. (4.5)
If f(n) diverges to infinity as n goes to infinity, the right hand side of inequality (4.5)
converges to 0. Keeping other parameters fixed, this implies δn could decrease in the order
of exp(−ρ¯ε2f(n)/5). Formally, we summarize these discussions with the next proposition.
Proposition 4 Suppose there exists a diverging sequence f(n) such that kn,σ
∗
i > f(n) for
any agent i in network Gn with associated equilibrium σ
n,∗, then δ-perfect learning could
occur with learning rate {δn}∞n=1, where each δn is in the order of exp(−ρ¯ε2f(n)/5).
The next example is a direct application of Proposition 4.
Example 3 Suppose f(n) = C · n where 0 < C < 1, then δ-perfect learning could occur
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with learning rate {δn}∞n=1, where each δn is in the order of exp(−ρ¯ε2Cn/5).
An interpretation of this example is that, even if communication is sparse in the sense that
each of the agents can only get a small proportion of information in the entire population,
perfect learning can still be reached at a fast rate. This example represents a scenario in
which communication networks in a society consist of dispersed social groups while agents
within these social groups are very closely connected. This is related to interesting results
pertaining to social cliques or homophily as discussed in Golub and Jackson (2012a,b,c).
In most models, however, there is no universal bound for kn,σ
∗
i . Lemma 3 in the
supplementary materials renders Proposition 4 as a special case, but it still does not
cover cases when direct conservative estimate for kn,σ
∗
i is not feasible. Next we consider
such a case: the binomial tree, which is widely considered as an axiomatic representation
of various hierarchical structures in the human society Jackson (2010). In particular, as
the information flow within a binomial tree can be either from the root to the leafs or
from the leafs to the root, binomial trees can accommodate both the top-down and the
bottom-up cases of information transmission in various real-world scenarios. Hence, it is
instructive to analyze the binomial tree with a few different settings, where we generalize
our game by allowing the information sensitiveness ψ = ψn to vary along the society
{Gn}∞n=1.
Example 4 (Binomial Tree: Information Flow from Root to Leafs) The agents
in the communication network Gn form a binomial tree, where information can only
flow from root to leafs. For simplicity, consider only the number of agents n such that
n = 1 + 2 + 4 + ...+ 2(mn−1), where mn is the number of layers in the binomial tree. The
following graph illustrates such a binomial tree with three layers.
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We will study two scenarios of this binomial tree, in both of which λ = r so that r¯ = 1/2.
i) ψn = ρ = ρ¯ = 1. For agent 1 on the top layer, he should exit right after step
0 because he does not have any chance to receive others’ private information. For
agent 2 and 3, who are on the second top layer, they decide between step 0 and 1. A
simple calculation on their pay off functions reveals that they should exit after step
0. Agents 4, 5, 6, 7 who are on the third layer potentially should decide between
0,1 and 2 steps. But since agents 2 and 3 cannot not pass through agent 1’s info,
step 2 is eliminated before any calculation. So agents on the third layer actually
faces same decision problems as agents on the second layer. Continue with the same
argument till the mn’th layer, we learn that everyone in the communication network
exits right after she gets the private signal. Therefore, this scenario is the same as
isolated points in terms of information aggregation.
In general, as depicted in this subcase i), when the communication game is less information
sensitive, the precision of the prior is higher, or the precision of the private signal is lower,
it is less likely to achieve δ-perfect learning, even if the agents are well connected.
ii) ψn <
2
ρ+(mn−1)ρ¯ − 1ρ+mnρ¯ and ε2 < −4ρ¯ log
(
1
2
√
ρ+2ρ¯
ρ+ρ¯
)
. Same as subcase i), agent 1
does not have a choice. For agents on the second layer to choose exit at step 1, we
need ψn <
2
ρ+ρ¯
− 1
ρ+2ρ¯
. For agents on the third layer to exit at step 2, we need
ψn < min
{
2
ρ+ ρ¯
− 1
ρ+ 2ρ¯
,
2
ρ+ 2ρ¯
− 1
ρ+ 3ρ¯
}
=
2
ρ+ 2ρ¯
− 1
ρ+ 3ρ¯
.
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In general, an agent on layer j wait till the j − 1 step if
ψn < min {g(1), . . . , g(j − 1)} = g(j − 1) .
where g(x) = 2
ρ+xρ¯
− 1
ρ+(x+1)ρ¯
. The last equality holds because g(x) is a decreasing
function, thanks to g′(x) < 0. Hence under equilibrium, agents on layer j have j
signals. In particular, agents in the last layer each has mn = log2(n + 1) signals.
Note that there are n+1
2
agents in this layer. Using (3.2), a similar derivation to
that in Example 2 leads to that the learning rate δn should be
δn >
1
nεε¯
√
π
log2(n+1)∑
i=1
2j−1
1√
ρ+ ρ¯j
exp
(
−ε
2(ρ+ ρ¯j)
4
)
.
To unravel right hand side of the above inequality, we let
h(x) = 2x−1
1√
ρ+ ρ¯x
exp
(
−ε
2(ρ+ ρ¯x)
4
)
.
Then h(x) is monotone increasing, because h(x+ 1)/h(x) > 1 under our condition.
Therefore, it is sufficient to have
δn >
1
nεε¯
√
π
log2(n+1)·2log2(n+1)−1
1√
ρ+ ρ¯ log2(n+ 1)
exp
(
−ε
2(ρ+ ρ¯ log2(n + 1))
4
)
.
Therefore δn could decay in the order of
√
log(n+ 1) · (n + 1)−ε2ρ¯/4, which is a
polynomial rate.
Compared to the complete graph, the binomial tree aggregates information much
slower. The difference in learning rates arises not only from the physical network struc-
tures, but also from different strategic interactions among agents in the two environments.
Next, we consider a twin case of the binomial tree, in which information flows in the op-
posite direction.
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Example 5 (Binomial Tree: Information Flow from Leafs to Root) Now let in-
formation flow from leafs to root, i.e., reverse all the directed edges in Example 4. The
following graph illustrates such a binomial tree with three layers.
1
2 3
4 5 6 7
We give the following results. The detailed analysis is similar to Example 4.
i) ψn = ρ = ρ¯ = 1. All agents exit after time 0.
ii) ψn <
2
ρ+2(mn−1)ρ¯
− 1
ρ+2mn ρ¯
. All agents get the maximum number of signals that they
could possibly get, then δn can be such that
δn >
1
nεǫ¯
√
π
log2(n+1)∑
j=1
2j−1
1√
ρ+ 2(mn−j+1)ρ¯
exp
(
−ε
2(ρ+ 2(mn−j+1)ρ¯)
4
)
.
A conservative estimate on the summation on the right hand side would give δn ∼
n−3/4, a much faster rate than that in Example 4 when ε2ρ¯ ≪ 3, which can be
considered as a typical case as we have in mind very small ε.
Note that different information flow directions matter for learning rates. When pa-
rameters are in comparable range, the bottom-up case exhibits a higher learning rate than
the top-down case does. In other words, the bottom-up organization of information flow
within a binomial tree is more efficient in terms of aggregating information. This result
is consistent with early economics and sociology literature; Hayek (1945) for example,
highlight the importance of dispersed information sources.
The four sub-cases under binomial tree setting demonstrate that beyond a directed
graphical model, contextual information is also very important for information aggre-
gation. These comparisons are made possible only with help of our concept of finite
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population learning and δ-perfect learning. Properties or statistics of the graph alone
cannot determine the learning status. Rather, as we argued from the very beginning of
this work, the enriched game theory plus graphical modeling approach are both interesting
and necessary in helping understand the information aggregation in social networks.
5 Remarks and Further Research
We have proposed a finite population learning concept to capture the level of information
aggregation in any given communication network. In our framework, one equilibrium out-
come, i.e., the number of signals obtained by an agent when she makes a decision, plays
a key role. This equilibrium outcome is computable (Mckelvey and Mclennan (1996)),
which also allows us to numerically check the learning status. Different from existing
literature that mainly addresses the learning behavior at the limit, this new concept helps
reveal explicit interplays among time discount, frequency of communication, information
precision and information sensitiveness of the decision problem in any finite communica-
tion network. As the total amount of information is fixed in a given finite network, our
approach enables meaningful comparative statics regarding the effectiveness of informa-
tion aggregation in networks. We also provide conditions for learning under a particular
equilibrium, under any equilibrium, and under all equilibria, respectively. Thanks to its
tractability and transparency, the finite population learning concept offers a solid foun-
dation to investigate long run dynamics of learning behavior and the associated learning
rates as population diverges.
Our analysis is also subject to certain limitations, which suggest directions for future
research. In our model, complete information on the structure of a given communication
network is required in determining the number of signals obtained by an agent, and in
checking its corresponding learning status. In some circumstances, researchers do not
want to assume such specific information; rather they want to get some understanding
of the learning status regarding a large class of networks. This goal calls for some new
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criteria that can determine the learning status for given classes of networks with given
finite population; ideally, these criteria should be formulated in terms of some summary
statistics of these networks. Relaxing the knowledge on specific network structure may also
lead to more general results about the learning rates. However, this task is challenging
within the current finite population learning framework. Specifically, our established
conditions for finite population learning require all agents’ exact numbers of signals upon
their exits. Only knowing some commonly used summary statistics of the associated
graphs can hardly help offer good estimates of these numbers of signals, mostly because
these numbers of signals are also affected by other parameters not directly related to
the network structure, such as the information precisions and the tolerances of learning.
Therefore, the learning status of a certain class of communication networks is largely
undetermined if we just consider properties of the graphs. To address this issue, we
would like to have novel statistical properties of communication networks that are more
friendly to the analysis of communication learning. Golub and Jackson (2012a,b,c) are
promising attempts towards this direction, but their results are limited to the context of
non-Bayesian observational learning.
Another line of generalization is to make our model more flexible and realistic. For
example, the current setting assumes that agents have private signals with the same
precision, which amounts to assuming that the total amount of information grows linearly
with the population size when we consider the perfect learning. It might be interesting
to allow the total information to increase in a nonlinear (e.g., log rate) fashion with the
population size, and allow non-uniform distribution of signal precisions among agents.
Also, even when we focus on certain classes of networks without specifying complete
network structure, it is still assumed that any agent in the communication network knows
the complete network structure. This assumption can be relaxed by limiting agents’
knowledge on the network to a certain local neighborhood, and infer other parts of the
network according to her local knowledge. Keeping the Bayesian learning paradigm,
other potential generalizations of our current work include considering the implications of
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correlated private information among agents, and heterogeneous characteristics of agents.
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Proof of Proposition 1. To prevent (ε, ε¯, δ)-learning, it is enough to show that a lower
bound of Pσn,∗
(
1
n
∑n
i=1 (1−Mn,εi ) > ε¯
)
is greater than δ. It follows from Markov inequal-
ity,
Pσn,∗
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
Mn,εi > 1− ε¯
)
6 n−1(1−ε¯)−1
n∑
i=1
Eσn,∗M
n,ε
i = n
−1(1−ε¯)−1
n∑
i=1
erf

ε
√
ρ+ ρ¯kn,σ
∗
i
2

 .
This implies that
Pσn,∗
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
(1−Mn,εi ) > ε¯
)
> 1− n−1(1− ε¯)−1
n∑
i=1
erf

ε
√
ρ+ ρ¯kn,σ
∗
i
2

 .
Therefore, it is enough to take
1− n−1(1− ε¯)−1
n∑
i=1
erf

ε
√
ρ+ ρ¯kn,σ
∗
i
2

 > δ ,
which concludes that condition (3.1) is necessary for (ε, ε¯, δ)-learning.
To ensure (ε, ε¯, δ)-learning, note that
Pσn,∗
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
(1−Mn,εi ) > ε¯
)
6
Eσn,∗ (
∑n
i=1(1−Mn,εi ))
nε¯
=
n−∑ni=1 erf
(
ε
√
ρ+ρ¯kn,σ
∗
i
2
)
nε¯
.
Demanding the right hand side of the above inequality no larger than δ, is the same as
assuming condition (3.2). This completes the proof.
The following provides a more general sufficient condition for δ-perfect learning. Given
equilibria {σn,∗}∞n=1, let f1 > f2 > . . . > fJ , where each fj(n) is a monotone increasing
1
function (not necessarily strictly increasing) on n, and let {bjn, j = 1, . . . , J} be such that
|{i : kn,σ∗i > f1(n)}|
n
> b1n ,
|{i : f1(n) > kn,σ∗i > f2(n)}|
n
> b2n ,
and up until
|{i : fJ−1(n) > kn,σ∗i > fJ(n)}|
n
> bJn .
Clearly, b1n, . . . , b
J
n ∈ (0, 1) and 0 6 b1n + . . . + bJn 6 1. The rest agents i’s are such that
fJ(n) > k
n,σ∗
i > 1. Their fraction is at most 1− (b1n + . . .+ bJn).
Lemma 3 δ-perfect learning occurs if
(a) limn→∞
∑J
j=1 b
j
n = 1,
(b) for each j ∈ {1 . . . , J}, limn→∞ bjn
(
1− erf
(
ε
√
ρ+ρ¯fj(n)
2
))
= 0 .
Proof of Lemma 3. Recall that a sufficient condition for (ε, ε¯, δn)-learning is
1
n
n∑
i=1
erf

ε
√
ρ+ ρ¯kn,σ
∗
i
2

 > 1− δnε .
Then by the definition of bjn and fj , it is enough to have
J∑
j=1
erf
(
ε
√
ρ+ ρ¯fj(n)
2
)
· bjn +
(
1−
J∑
j=1
bjn
)
erf
(
ε
√
ρ+ ρ¯
2
)
> 1− δnε .
This translates to
δn >
1
ε¯
(
J∑
j=1
bjn
(
1− erf
(
ε
√
ρ+ ρ¯fj(n)
2
))
+
(
1−
J∑
j=1
bjn
)(
1− erf
(
ε
√
ρ+ ρ¯
2
)))
.
To ensure the existence of {δn} such that limn→∞ δn = 0, it is enough to have
2
limn→∞
∑J
j=1 b
j
n = 1 and
lim
n→∞
bjn
(
1− erf
(
ε
√
ρ+ ρ¯fj(n)
2
))
= 0, for j ≤ J.
Note that if fj does not increase strictly for n > N
∗, bjn needs to decrease to 0. Also,
allowing more than one tolerances among ε, ε¯, δ to vary with population size n leads
to interesting learning results. In particular, from the proof of Lemma 3, a sufficient
condition for (ε, ε¯n, δn)- learning is
δnε¯n >
J∑
j=1
bjn
(
1− erf
(
ε
√
ρ+ ρ¯fj(n)
2
))
+
(
1−
J∑
j=1
bjn
)(
1− erf
(
ε
√
ρ+ ρ¯
2
))
.
In this condition, the role of δn and that of ε¯n are completely interchangeable, which
implies that we can trade in some probabilistic confidence for some fraction of agents who
make wrong decisions.
The following provides a generalized version of Lemma 2 when Assumption 2 is relaxed.
Lemma 4 (Generalized Lemma 2) For any agent i, either the communication steps
she optimally experiences before taking an action in any social network Gn along a society
{Gn}∞n=1 is bounded from above by a constant independent of n, or she waits until the
maximum allowable step. Specifically,
(a) If (ρ+ ρ¯)ψ > 1, then for any agent i
ln,σ
∗
i 6 l
n
i < min
{
(Lni )max, ln
(
1− 1
(ρ+ ρ¯)ψ
)
/ ln r¯
}
,
where lni stands for agent i’s optimal communication rounds given that other agents
wait till the maximum allowable step.
(b) If (ρ+ ρ¯)ψ 6 0 (equivalently, ψ ≤ 0), then for any agent i
ln,σ
∗
i = l
n
i = (L
n
i )max .
3
(c) If 0 < (ρ+ ρ¯)ψ 6 1, then there are two subcases.
(c.1) For agent i with
lim
n→∞
|Bni | <
1− ρψ
ρ¯ψ
,
where Bni is the set of agents whose signals agent i can get if no one exits before
maximum allowable step, we have
ln,σ
∗
i = l
n
i = (L
n
i )max .
(c.2) For agent i with
lim
n→∞
|Bni | >
1− ρψ
ρ¯ψ
,
we have either
ln,σ
∗
i 6 l
n
i 6 min
(
(Lni )max, l
{Gn}∞n=1
i
)
,
or
ln,σ
∗
i = (L
n
i )max ,
where l
{Gn}∞n=1
i is a constant that depends on the society and agent i’s position
in the society, but does not change with n.
Proof of Lemma 4. We proceed case by case.
Case (a), (ρ+ ρ¯)ψ > 1.
In this case, agent i enjoys a positive payoff ψ− 1
ρ+ρ¯
if she exists at t = 0 and does not
communicate with anyone else. Note that her expected payoff by taking lni communication
steps is strictly upper bounded by r¯l
n
i ψ. Therefore, it is suboptimal for her to choose a lni
such that
r¯l
n
i ψ 6 ψ − 1
ρ+ ρ¯
,
which implies
lni < ln
(
1− 1
(ρ+ ρ¯)ψ
)
/ ln r¯
4
is necessary for agent i’s optimality. It is obvious that ln,σ
∗
i 6 l
n
i , since other agents do
not necessarily wait forever in an equilibrium, so that it may be optimal for agent i to exit
earlier too. We get the result by combining these with the upper bound lni 6 (L
n
i )max.
Case (b), (ρ+ ρ¯)ψ 6 0.
Now agent i always gets a negative payoff whenever she exits. Because waiting dis-
counts the negative payoff, she optimally chooses to wait as long as possible, no matter
what other agents do. Therefore, ln,σ
∗
i = l
n
i = (L
n
i )max.
Case (c.1), 0 < (ρ+ ρ¯)ψ 6 1 and limn→∞ |Bni | < 1−ρψρ¯ψ .
The maximum number of private signals agent i can get is |Bni |. Again, agent i always
gets a negative payoff whenever she exists. Hence, ln,σ
∗
i = l
n
i = (L
n
i )max .
Case (c.2), 0 < (ρ+ ρ¯)ψ 6 1 and limn→∞ |Bni | > 1−ρψρ¯ψ .
For any Gn with |Bni | > 1−ρψρ¯ψ , we consider the communication step (Lni )max when
agent i obtains signals from all her sources Bni , provided others wait maximum steps.
Note that (Lni )max is non-decreasing in n for any agent i (by the no deleting assumption),
and |Bni,l| is strictly monotone increasing in l when l 6 (Lni )max.
Also for a given communication network Gn, there exists one communication step
ln
′
i such that after this step agent i gets positive payoff, given that other agents wait
maximum steps. Hence, it is suboptimal for her to wait longer than ln
′
i if
r¯ψ 6 ψ − 1
ρ+ ρ¯|Bn
i,ln
′
i
| ,
which implies
|Bni,ln
i
| < λ+ r − ρrψ
ρ¯rψ
(5.1)
is necessary for agent lni ’s optimality.
Now we consider two sub-cases. First is when limn→∞ |Bni | <∞. Then we must have
limn→∞(Lni )max <∞ , since (Lni )max 6 |Bni |. Hence,
lni 6 lim
n→∞
(Lni )max <∞ ,
5
for all Gn satisfying |Bni | > 1−ρψρ¯ψ and limn→∞ |Bni | < ∞. We denote limn→∞(Lni )max as
l
{Gn}∞n=1
1i , which is a constant that depends on the society and agent i’s position in the
society and does not change with respect to n.
Second, we discuss the case when limn→∞ |Bni | = ∞. Now there should be either
limn→∞(Lni )max < ∞ or limn→∞(Lni )max = ∞ . In the former scenario, we have lni 6
limn→∞(Lni )max = l
{Gn}∞n=1
1i for all Gn. In the latter case, as (L
n
i )max is non-decreasing in
n for any given i and |Bni,l| is strictly monotone increasing in l when l 6 (Lni )max for any
Gn, there exists a largest GN with its associated (L
N
i )max that satisfies condition (5.1).
Hence, by (5.1) we obtain
lni 6 (L
N
i )max ,
for all Gn satisfying |Bni | > 1−ρψρ¯ψ , limn→∞ |Bni | =∞ and limn→∞(Lni )max =∞ .We denote
such (LNi )max as l
{Gn}∞n=1
2i , which is again a constant that depends on the society and agent
i’s position in the society and does not change with respect to n. To sum up, we denote
by l
{Gn}∞n=1
i either l
{Gn}∞n=1
1i or l
{Gn}∞n=1
2i in respective cases, and it follows l
n
i 6 l
{Gn}∞n=1
i for
agent i in such Gn with |Bni | > 1−ρψρ¯ψ , where l
{Gn}∞n=1
i is independent of n.
As for ln,σ
∗
i , since other agents play equilibrium strategies, agent i gets weakly fewer
signals than that she can get when other agents wait maximum steps. There can be two
cases, either she gets positive payoff and takes an action weakly earlier, namely, ln,σ
∗
i 6 l
n
i ,
or she cannot get enough signals to ensure a positive payoff so that she optimally until
the maximum allowable step, i.e., ln,σ
∗
i = (L
n
i )max. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. By Lemma 3, it suffices to show that limn→∞ k
n,σ∗
i =∞ under
any equilibria {σn,∗}∞n=1 for any socially informed agent i. In the following, we consider a
fixed socially informed agent i. Recall that in Definition 6, Li is defined as the smallest
positive integer such that limn→∞ |Bni,Li| = ∞ . Denote by Bn,σ
∗
i,l the set of agents whose
signals can reach i in the first l rounds of communication under equilibrium σn,∗.
The problem is simple when Li = 1. Clearly, B
n,σ∗
i,1 = B
n
i,1 under any equilibrium σ
n,∗.
6
As agent i is socially informed, we have for sufficiently large n
ψ − 1
ρ+ ρ¯|Bn,σ∗i,1 |
> 0 under any σn,∗
and
r¯
(
ψ − 1
ρ+ ρ¯|Bn,σ∗i,1 |
)
> ψ − 1
ρ+ ρ¯
under any σn,∗ .
The above display implies that agent i should at least wait for one communication
round. Hence, kn,σ
∗
i > |Bn,σ
∗
i,1 | under any σn,∗ for sufficiently large n. As a consequence,
limn→∞ k
n,σ∗
i > limn→∞ |Bn,σ
∗
i,1 | = limn→∞ |Bni,1| =∞ under any {σn,∗}∞n=1.
The following discussion is on the cases when Li > 2. We proceed through three steps.
Step 1. We claim when Li > 2, for sufficiently large n, there exists at least one path
{jLi−1, jLi−2, ..., j1, i} from jLi−1 to i such that
lim
n→∞
|BnjLi−l,l| =∞ for all l ∈ {1, . . . , Li − 1} . (5.2)
Now we construct the path {jLi−1, jLi−2, ..., j1, i} that satisfies condition (5.2). Because Li
is the smallest integer j such that limn→∞ |Bni,j| =∞, Bni,Li−1\Bni,Li−2, the set of agents that
are of distance Li− 1 to i, must be finite in the limit, i.e., limn→∞ |Bni,Li−1 \Bni,Li−2| <∞.
Therefore, there is at least one agent j of distance Li−1 to i, such that limn→∞ |Bnj,1| =∞.
We denote one of such agents j as jLi−1. If Li = 2, the desired path has been constructed.
When Li > 3, choose any path {jLi−1, jLi−2, ..., j1, i} from the chosen jLi−1 to i. Clearly,
jLi−l ∈ Bni,Li−l. Moreover, condition (5.2) is satisfied in view of limn→∞ |BnjLi−1,1| =∞.
Step 2. We next argue that when Li > 2, agent jLi−l on the path {jLi−1, jLi−2, ..., j1, i}
will not exit before she experiences l communication steps under any equilibrium σn,∗
provided that n is sufficiently large. It is worth noting that agent jLi−l does not necessarily
get a positive payoff when she experiences l communication steps in equilibrium.
We will see this by induction from jLi−1 to j1 sequentially. We first show that agent
jLi−1 will not exit before she experiences her first communication step in any equilibrium
7
σn,∗ provided that n is sufficiently large. It requires that there exists N such that for all
social networks Gn ∈ {Gn}∞n=1 and its associated equilibrium σn,∗ with n > N ,
r¯
(
ψ − 1
ρ+ ρ¯|Bn,σ∗jLi−1,1|
)
> ψ − 1
ρ+ ρ¯
. (5.3)
To validate condition (5.3), recall condition (4.3) from Definition 6 for l = Li − 1,
which states that there exists N such that for all social networks Gn ∈ {Gn}∞n=1 with
n > N it holds
r¯
(
ψ − 1
ρ+ ρ¯|Bni,Li|
)
> ψ − 1
ρ+ ρ¯|Bni,Li−1|
. (5.4)
By the definition of Li, the construction of jLi−1 and the fact that B
n,σ∗
jLi−1,1
= BnjLi−1,1
under
any equilibrium σn,∗ with any n, we know that limn→∞ |Bn,σ∗jLi−1,1| = limn→∞ |B
n
jLi−1,1
| =∞
under any σn,∗ and limn→∞ |Bni,Li−1| <∞. Also we have |Bni,Li−1| > 1. Note that the right
hand side of condition (5.4) is greater than or equal to the right hand side of condition
(5.3), we obtain easily that (5.3) holds for sufficiently large n. Hence we get that agent
jLi−1 will not exit before she experiences her first communication step under any σ
n,∗
provided that n is sufficiently large.
We then show that agent jLi−2 (for Li ≥ 3) will not exit before she experiences her
second communication step under any equilibrium for sufficiently large n. It requires
that there exists N such that for all social networks Gn ∈ {Gn}∞n=1 and its associated
equilibrium σn,∗ with n > N ,
r¯2
(
ψ − 1
ρ+ ρ¯|Bn,σ∗jLi−2,2|
)
> ψ − 1
ρ+ ρ¯
, (5.5)
and
r¯2
(
ψ − 1
ρ+ ρ¯|Bn,σ∗jLi−2,2|
)
> r¯
(
ψ − 1
ρ+ ρ¯|Bn,σ∗jLi−2,1|
)
. (5.6)
To validate (5.5) and (5.6), we use again the condition (4.3) from Definition 6 for
l = Li−2 and l = Li−1, which state that there exists N such that for all social networks
8
Gn ∈ {Gn}∞n=1 with n > N we have
r¯2
(
ψ − 1
ρ+ ρ¯|Bni,Li|
)
> ψ − 1
ρ+ ρ¯|Bni,Li−2|
, (5.7)
and
r¯2
(
ψ − 1
ρ+ ρ¯|Bni,Li|
)
> r¯
(
ψ − 1
ρ+ ρ¯|Bni,Li−1|
)
. (5.8)
Similarly, by the definition of Li and the construction of jLi−1 and jLi−2, we know that
limn→∞ |BnjLi−2,2| = limn→∞ |B
n
i,Li
| = ∞, limn→∞ |Bni,Li−1| < ∞, limn→∞ |Bni,Li−2| < ∞,
and limn→∞ |Bn,σ∗jLi−2,1| 6 limn→∞ |B
n
jLi−2,1
| <∞ under any equilibrium σn,∗. Also we have
|Bni,Li−2| > 1 and Bn,σ
∗
jLi−2,1
⊆ BnjLi−2,1 ⊆ B
n
i,Li−1 (and thus |Bni,Li−1| > |BnjLi−2,1| > |B
n,σ∗
jLi−2,1
|)
for any n under any equilibrium σn,∗. Note that the right hand side of condition (5.7) is
greater than or equal to the right hand side of condition (5.5), and the right hand side of
condition (5.8) is greater than or equal to the right hand side of condition (5.6). Then it
can be verified that the next two inequalities hold for sufficiently large n, the right hand
sides of which are the same as those in conditions (5.5) and (5.6):
r¯2
(
ψ − 1
ρ+ ρ¯|BnjLi−2,2|
)
> ψ − 1
ρ+ ρ¯
, (5.9)
and
r¯2
(
ψ − 1
ρ+ ρ¯|BnjLi−2,2|
)
> r¯
(
ψ − 1
ρ+ ρ¯|Bn,σ∗jLi−2,1|
)
. (5.10)
Furthermore, recall that we have already shown that agent jLi−1 will not exit before
she experiences her first communication step under any equilibrium σn,∗ provided that n
is sufficiently large, which implies that Bn,σ
∗
jLi−1,1
⊆ Bn,σ∗jLi−2,2 under any σ
n,∗ for sufficiently
large n, and thus limn→∞ |Bn,σ∗jLi−2,2| > limn→∞ |B
n,σ∗
jLi−1,1
| = ∞ under any equilibrium σn,∗.
Also we know that limn→∞ |Bn,σ∗jLi−2,1| < ∞. Together with conditions (5.9) and (5.10),
these facts validate conditions (5.5) and (5.6). Hence we get that agent jLi−2 will not
exit before she experiences her second communication step in any σn,∗ provided that n is
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sufficiently large.
The arguments above for jLi−2 can be extended successively to j1. Hence, under any
equilibrium σn,∗, no jLi−l in the established path {jLi−1, jLi−2, ..., j1, i} will exit before
she experiences l communication steps under any equilibrium σn,∗ provided that n is
sufficiently large. A byproduct is that limn→∞ |Bn,σ∗jLi−l,l| = ∞ under any σ
n,∗, for l ∈
{1, 2, ..., Li − 1}.
Step 3. Finally, we argue that the socially informed agent i will not exit before
she experiences Li communication steps under any equilibrium σ
n,∗ when n is sufficiently
large. It requires that there exists N ∈ N such that for all social networks Gn ∈ {Gn}∞n=1
with n > N , we have
ψ − 1
ρ+ ρ¯|Bn,σ∗i,Li |
> 0 , (5.11)
and
r¯Li
(
ψ − 1
ρ+ ρ¯|Bn,σ∗i,Li |
)
> r¯l
(
ψ − 1
ρ+ ρ¯|Bn,σ∗i,l |
)
, (5.12)
for all l < Li.
Recall that we have already shown that agent jLi−l in the constructed path will
not exit before she experiences Li − l communication steps for l ∈ {1, 2, ..., Li − 1},
under any equilibrium σn,∗ provided that n is sufficiently large, which implies that
Bn,σ
∗
jLi−1,1
⊆ Bn,σ∗j2,Li−2 ⊆ ... ⊆ Bn,σ
∗
j1,Li−1 ⊆ Bn,σ
∗
i,Li
under any σn,∗ for sufficiently large n, and thus
limn→∞ |Bn,σ∗i,Li | > limn→∞ |Bn,σ
∗
j1,Li−1| > ... > limn→∞ |Bn,σ
∗
jLi−2,2
| > limn→∞ |Bn,σ∗jLi−1,1| =∞ un-
der any σn,∗. Also, we have Bn,σ
∗
i,l ⊆ Bni,l and thus |Bn,σ
∗
i,l | 6 |Bni,l|, under any σn,∗ for
l ∈ {1, 2, ..., Li−1}, which implies the right hand sides of condition (4.3) are greater than
or equal to th right hand sides of condition (5.12), for l ∈ {1, 2, ..., Li− 1}. Moreover, we
know that limn→∞ |Bn,σ∗i,l | 6 limn→∞ |Bni,l| < ∞ for l ∈ {1, 2, ..., Li − 1} by the definition
of Li. Together with conditions (4.2) and (4.3) in Definition 6, these facts validate con-
ditions (5.11) and (5.12). Hence we get that the socially informed agent i will not exit
before she experiences Li communication steps and she can enjoy a positive payoff when
she experiences Li communication steps, under any σ
n,∗ provided that n is sufficiently
10
large. This further implies kn,σ
∗
i > |Bn,σ
∗
i,Li
| under any σn,∗ with sufficiently large n, which
finally leads to limn→∞ |kn,σ∗i | > limn→∞ |Bni,Li| = limn→∞ |Bni,Li| = ∞ under any σn,∗
when Li > 2. This concludes the proof.
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